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
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TOPIC:

PAK-CHINA COOPERATION IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGION

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PAK-CHINA COOPERATION IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGION

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ABSTRACT:

This research paper mainly studies and explores the bilateral relations between Pakistan and China. Pakistan and China became independent shortly after World War II. When China became independent, Pakistan immediately recognized China and the reason for this immediate action was the development of bilateral relations and the threat posed by India to both in the region. The full military support of Russia and the United States was of great importance to India, thanks to which India began to gain power in the region and a bipartisan relationship was necessary to deal with its aggression. Tensions with India not only helped to bring Pakistan and China closer, but also quickly resolved border disputes. While the Soviet threat and the dual policy of the United States brought Pakistan closer to China, Pakistan acted as a bridge between China and the West to improve their relations. In the same way, the race for the regional leadership, Pakistan helped China against the global conspiracies. Similarly, China assisted in meeting the defense and economic needs of Pakistan and created a challenge for India by launching various trade and economic projects. One of which is the trade freight scheme. This is a possible plan for China's supremacy in the region's economic balance, and the United States, including India, fears it. Pak-China relations have been boosted in view of these common threats due to US intervention through India and then India's policy of annihilation of Pakistan to prevent this from happening. Even in the race for power, China needs Pakistan's close cooperation so that it can reach the global market. Therefore, a common enemy, India, has brought these two countries closer to each other in bilateral relations.

KEYWORDS: China, Pakistan, Bilateral, Relations, Strategic, India, Factor, etc.

INTRODUCTION: The aim of this study is to analytically view the nature of the strategic, economic and political relationship among Pakistan and China. It explores how much Indo-Pak relations have been influenced by the Sino-Pak growing ties from the early 1970. Pakistan is the most important and only Islamic nuclear power in South Asia. China is the largest country in the world in terms of population located in the northeast of Pakistan. Based on its leadership capabilities and its policy of peaceful coexistence, China is now the world's largest economic power. Pakistan-China relations are intolerable to the United States and India and they do their utmost to weaken these relations in order to gain supremacy in the region. But India's aggressive and destructive policy for the region is a key factor in promoting Pak-China relations. This research paper examines this aspect.

Research Methodology : This is an analytical study on India as a factor in Pakistan-China bilateral relations. It is very clear that Pakistan has faced the Indian aggression many times. Pakistan and China bilateral relations are very important for the peace of South Asia. The study based on historic method of research with the help of documentary sources i.e. books, articles, essays, newspapers etc.

Review of Literature : Many scholars and historians worked about the Pakistan-China relation. For the review of literature We have consulted the most concerning sources about this important topic. Aziz¹ analyzes the Pakistan china relation not only he also judged the relation of the people of both sides. Arif² pointed out the relations of Pakistan and China. Ameen³ comprehensively explained and explored the relationship between these countries.

He highlights the foreign policy of the Pakistan and China. Burki and Ziring⁴ also explained the importance of Pakistan China Relations. Kiani , Ahmad, Tahir⁵, also explored the economic importance of these relations in 21st century. Hasan⁶ work is also important for Pakistan China Relations, G.W chauhdri⁷, Fazal⁸, Cheema⁹, Ahsan¹⁰, and Butt¹¹ work is very useful for this research.

Discussion: Since the establishment of Indian independence, the United States and the Soviet Union have been trying to make it a leader in South Asia. While India's military and political supremacy in South Asia is considered a threat to all countries in the region, partly because of India's aggressive policy towards its neighbors. India has been fighting all the states along its border since 1947. While China's emerging power in the region posed a challenge to the United States and the Western world, it also struck a balance of power in the region, ending India's military supremacy. The Kashmir issue became the cause of war between Pakistan and India and Pakistan faced constant Indian aggression while another neighboring country which is a power in the region and also faces common threats and challenges as a whole. The two emerged as strong allies. And the two have become strong strategic partners-While economic and military needs are paramount in their bilateral relations, India is also a major factor whose aggressive policy and conspiracies at the behest of the US have brought the two countries closer together.

Bilateral relationships of Pakistan and China were begun in 1949. Pakistan was among those first countries which recognize the People's Republic of China.¹² Pakistan was among those first countries which recognize the People's Republic of China. The relationship of Pakistan with PRC became stronger and tremendously close after the China and Indian War of 1962 regarding Tibet. Since the time, the both countries have signed number of agreements and made several visits of high level regularly.. The People's Republic of China was provided technical, military and economic aid and assistance to Pakistan. Both countries are considered as a strategic ally.¹³ Bilateral relations have evolved from an initial Chinese policy of neutrality to a partnership with a smaller but militarily powerful Pakistan. Diplomatic relations were established in 1950, military assistance began in 1966, a strategic alliance was formed in 1972 and economic co-operation began in 1979. China has become Pakistan's largest supplier of arms and its third-largest trading partner.¹⁴ China strongly supported Pakistan's opposition to Soviet Union involvement in Afghanistan and was perceived by Pakistan as a regional counterweight to India. China and Pakistan also share a close military relation, with China supplying a range of modern armaments to the Pakistani defence forces. China supports Pakistan's stance on Kashmir while Pakistan supports China on the issues of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan. Lately, military cooperation has deepened with joint projects producing armaments ranging from fighter jets to guided missile frigates.¹⁵ After 1962 a war between China and India brought close these two countries. In 1963 Pak-Sino agreement drew the position of relation between these countries. Both countries have worst relation with India and this factor played an important role for Pak-China relation. The regional condition and the pressure of west in this part of the world urges Pakistan and China to adopt a common policy about the issues of the world and region especially Kashmir, Afghanistan and Tibet.

Shift in Chinese South Asia policy after Mao and particularly in the post-Cold war settings are the major areas of the concern. Chinese pragmatic outlook toward the strategic equation between India-Pakistan has changed in comparison to the emerging nature of geo-strategic and it has an impact on the degree and nature of Chinese influence in the region. The Present study is mainly focusing on the transformation in the regional and international relations at the end of the cold War to race out the impact on the regional and bilateral dynamic of the three States, China, India and Pakistan.¹⁶

In the wake of the modernization drive being pursued by China and Indian drive is to liberalize their economics and the 'growing pursuit of normalization between India and Pakistan in comparison to Indo-Chinese efforts to accommodate each other, are a reflection of divergent held by the major players in South Asia.¹⁷ The questions that need to be examined in the contemporary India-Pakistan, Sino-India and Pak-China relations are: Whether the nature of strategic relations will change between India and China, in the backdrop of globalization trends? What is the nature of relationship between India and China? What an extend India. Consider relations as a threat and vice versa? What would be the spillover effects on Indo China relations of the growing possibilities of an Indo-Pakistan arms race? Will Pak-China relations categorically be different in future or not? Will economic issues take precedence over security issues in South Asia? Does China continue a threat to India? How for is the normalization processes likely to change and will it bring about changes in the relations between the three States? Will Pak-China relations be mutually exclusive to Pak-India relations or not? What will the future of Indo-China relations? What role is to be played by Pakistan? What is the significance of China in the Indian threat perception? How far a sustained level or equilibrium does exist among India, Pakistan and China strategic triangle. After the Sino-Indian War in 1962, China was confronted during this period with a two-sided threat in its dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union and the start of troubled relation with India over Tibet in 1962.¹⁸

In 1961, Pakistan and China had started negotiation on the settlement of the boundary between the two states. After the 1962 India-China war, the strength and pace in the Pak-China negotiations increased. A border agreement between Pakistan and China over the settlement of the boundary between the two states was signed in 1963.¹⁹ In September 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister blamed India for the current situation and condemned it for provocative of the cease-fire line in Kashmir and gave evidence that Beijing was to support Pakistan's just action in repelling the Indian attack.²⁰ During the 1971 War the Indo-Soviet alliance affected on the ground reality for Pakistan. The war resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. The creation of Bangladesh and more sustained Indo-Soviet relationship during the war had not been a positive development for both Pakistan and China. The permanent representative of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in the United Nations strongly condemned the role of Soviet Union and India in the dismemberment of Pakistan.²¹

Beijing's limited prospects in South Asia during early 1972 were well demonstrated the visit of president Bhutto of Pakistan to China from January, 31 to February 2, 1972. Although Beijing afforded Bhutto's political support and offered some measure of economic relief during the visit, yet there was an evident effort on both sides to let the dust settle in the South Asia while the Indian-Pakistani conflict and it's after math, major

international issues and bilateral relations. Despite the strong military representation in the visiting delegation, the only reference in the communiqué to Chinese assistance was a decision to help the development of the Pakistan's economy by converting four outstanding loans into grants and deferring payment on a loan provided in 1970. The Chinese muted their anti-Soviet polemic in deference to Bhutto's interested and concentrated their fire on the Indians during his visit, of January, 1972 and People's Daily editorial blistered the Soviets for supporting the dismemberment of Pakistan in the name of national liberation. As for as the question of Kashmir was concerned, The Chinese joined their visitors in a joint communiqué calling for withdrawal to positions "which respect the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir and Chou declared Chinese support for the people of Kashmir in their just struggle for the right to national self-determination." By mid-1974, the agreement between India and Pakistan to implement the UNT resolution on returning prisoner of war and normalizing relations promoted expressions of great Chinese interest in improved relations with India and Bangladesh.²²

At the same time Beijing continue to support Pakistan. Bhutto, now prime minister, returned to Beijing from 11-14 May 1974 and the Chinese gave him the same full honour, shown during his visit in early 1972. In marked contrast to Chinese comment during Bhutto's 1972 visit, Chinese Spokesman this time studiously avoided direct criticism of India's policies in South Asia. They instead endeavored portray China as having a common anti superpower interest with South Asian states, stressing that these states should be particularly vigilant against Soviet intensions.²³

During the next year, Beijing's suspicious about Indian expansionism in the region were marked reduced as the New Delhi tried to coup with serious internal crises caused by political scandals surrounding Mrs. Gandhi's leadership and dire economic conditions in India. The August 1975 military coup in Bangladesh was also seen in Beijing as a curb to Indian as well as Soviet ambitions.

China and Pakistan: Mutual interdependence : Pakistan is important for china because the geo-strategic needs in the region, to an extent, are reliably provided for by Pakistan. Pakistan is conscious of the fact that China has always displayed a special concern toward its neighbours. Pakistan, being a vital part of China's strategic relation, is always, fully committed to fully support china's peaceful development policies and prevent destabilization of Xinjiang from its borders. Pakistan also recognizes that China should be afforded a broad-based mutually beneficial opportunity of Pakistan's geopolitical position to make up for the limitations imposed by its own geography.²⁴

Pakistan's Geo-Strategic Significance for China: Pakistan holds immense geo-strategic significance for China. Pakistan is situated at the cross road of three regions that are South, Central and West Asia and the Middle East. It provides a secure access to Gwadar which is route to Persian Gulf and Central Asia. It provides the shortest route to Chinese goods through Gwadar, Port-Qasim, and Indus highway and Koh Krakram Highway (KKH) providing an easy trade access to Central and Western Asia. Currently, the most of the Central Asian states export their goods through Russia via Europe which is the longest route. The Gwadar port would be the most viable option for these countries helping them

to save money and as well as time in transporting their goods. As far as significance and implications of the Koh Rakram Highway (KKH) that runs through occupied Kashmir for the Indian security are concerned. China has economic and strategic interest in Gwadar is expected to play a key role in Beijing's development plans and will serve as a gateway for western China because Xinjiang 4500 km from China's east coast but just 2500 km from Gwadar. Pakistan can act as "a transit facility" giving China access to Central Asian markets and energy sources.²⁵

Pak-China Relations : Pak-China relations since their inception have been based on solid foundations and are likely to remain poised in the future and all weather relationship. The mutuality of interests is such that neither side can forego the benefits of the relations to either state. From a Chinese foreign policy perspective conflict and wars are counter-productive as China's indulges into such an activity, at this time in history could and can delay its rise to world as a great power. On the other hand an improved state of Sino-Indian relations would and can also inadvertently raise the stake for China amidst increasing Indo-US collaboration and the potential of India to use China as a means to justify its own rise to big power status. Hence, in the contemporary phase the relationship of rivalry between the two states cannot be replaced by a relationship of an increased state of friendship and strategic schism. In order to counter balance the Indian movement and her leverage in Beijing's central affairs. China requires a strong foothold in South Asia the only state, which can provide China with enough cushions to retard Indian development, will remain Pakistan. Therefore, in order to counter balance the developing New Delhi-US axis, the Islamabad-Beijing's stake on the South Asian front allows her to counter security threat from India and Indian power in the region at a more sustained level than some of Islamabad's earlier super power- relations. In the wake on increasing Indo-US relations, Pak-China relations are likely to get strengthened are to change only in the wake of the recession of threat from India to Pakistan or China. This is about happening at least in the near future. Nevertheless, like all interstate relationship, Pak-China relations are also dynamic and will change in nuances, like China's stand on Kashmir or non-proliferation, in the increasing demands on China as it is to play an enhanced role in the emerging and existing international system. However the change would be more in tune with China's bid to enter the world arena as a responsible power rather than as a change in the nature of the strategic relationship between Pakistan and China as remaining all weather friendship. In addition, Beijing would welcome any normalization attempts between Pakistan and India, as it is a great believer in containing the spectre of violence and inter State conflicts at lower levels. Nevertheless, any improvement the India-Pak relations are not likely to affect and will not affect Pak-China friendship or the deep-seated state of relations between the two States.²⁶ In 1969 Nixon visited Pakistan and expressed the wish to pursue a policy of engagement with china. He asked Pakistan's President Yahya Khan to act as a courier between Beijing and Washington to inquire about China's view in the normalization initiative suggested by the Nixon Administration. The mission was to be carried out with the utmost secrecy devoid of normal diplomatic channels. One of the reasons cited for

Nixon's decision to use Yahya Khan had sprung from the fact that Pakistan was one of the few non-communist countries, which had friendly and cordial relations with the PRC.²⁷ Initially the American over tune; was a by-product of breaking China from the soviet orbit and to harness the Chinese influence to contain Soviet influence. Hence initially Washington wanted to deal with issues like Taiwan, China-US relation etc. However, as a result of the diplomatic exchanges and Yahya's role, During the 1970s, Nixon offered a direct Channel to Washington. However, Beijing rejected the proposal and expressed its confidence in the use of the Islamabad channel.²⁸ In one of his message Zhou wrote to Yahya "we have had messages from the United States from different sources in the past that express their wish to establish a direct channel but the United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China, and great importance is attached to Pakistan, which should be registered by the United States. Referring to Nixon's proposal to Zhou Enlai to send a special envoy to Beijing Zhou had stated that "This is the first time a proposal had come from a Head of state through a Head to a Head of state". The degree of importance attached by Beijing and Washington on Islamabad signalled the fact that due to the mutuality of interest the level of interests between Beijing and Islamabad was second to none. There by enhancing the centrality of Beijing foreign relation with the West in particular. Henry Kissinger's visit to Beijing in 1971 after the withdrawal of the US troops from Vietnam brought an end to Yahya's role in the US-Beijing axis. Pakistan played a crucial role in breaking the climate of distrust between Washington and Beijing' and pursuing a diplomatic onslaught for restoring China's seat in the UN. China proved to be an exemplary friend in the aftermath of the 1971 war. The situation in East Pakistan had deteriorated substantially as a result of the 1970. The political deadlock had been disastrous for the country as it brought the civil war to its apex. The Chinese leaders did not support Yahya's domestic policy and at the unofficial level recommended that Islamabad handle the situation in different way and refrain from using force. However, despite their understanding of the domestic political situation and their hindsight they did not launch a moral attack in Pakistan publicly. According to the opinion makes this policy would have endangered China's relation with Pakistan as well her third World Policy. During Afghan crisis Pakistan emerged as the most active and the resolute opponent on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and, as a result, the friendship and cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad reached new heights. India's stance, reflecting the close relations between New Delhi and Moscow, was to justify and defend the Soviet intervention. The return to power of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in early 1980 saw a further accentuation of the pro-Soviet tilt of the Indian government. This led the Soviet government to increase the supply of sophisticated weapons to India at concessional price.²⁹

During the eighties, Pakistan remained a major cause of concern for India and the pace of the normalization drive in the region. Indo-Pak relations had deteriorated significantly due to the Kashmir conflict. As the Kashmir struggle movement gained a new pace, India claimed that Pakistan was the primary concern in the regions and was allegedly supporting 'terrorism' in Kashmir and Punjab. In this context, India launched an operation in Siachen in 1984 leading to re-escalation in Kashmir. In this context, Indians were particularly over

sensitive to Sino-Pak military relations, as well as Pakistan's status of a frontline state in the Afghan jihad. The main accusations were that Pak-China-US were involved in anti India axis geared towards a decreased or summarized role of India in the region. Pak-China relations were seen as a significant reason for maintaining a freeze in Indo-Chinese and Indo-US relations during this period. The issue of supply of sophisticated technology of missiles like M-11 and M-9 by China to Pakistan became a major cause for a setback for the normalization of the Sino-Indian relations.³⁰ In addition, India's concern over Pakistan's growing nuclear capacity was termed as a major source of concern for Indo-US tensions, as well as Sino-Indian tensions. Chinese military assistance to Pakistan in various projects, like the setting up on the Heavy Rebuilding factory to overhaul. Type 59 tanks, F-6 rebuilding factory, and the overhauling ability, in addition other projects like MBT-2000 Al-Khalid tank, Karakoram-8 trainer. Super 7-fighter jets etc, were right timed and again projected as a potent threat to India. The alleged Chinese assistance in nuclear and missile field continued to be a sour point in the development of the Indo-Chinese relations. Were China did go over a measure change in its policy stand on Kashmir dispute, during the eighties, it stated, that "both sides should settle the dispute in a peaceful manner and in a bilateral framework. The projected signal was that China was desirous normalization between India and China but not at expense of its strategic equation with Pakistan, either in the military field or in the socio-economic and political fields to the Indian requirements.³¹

SINO-INDIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

The visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 1988 marked the first contact at the head of government level between the two countries after 1960, when Premier Zhou En-Lai had visited India. This visit also reflected "advice" by Gorbachev to India to mend its fences with China.³²

With the end of the cold war brought about a noticeable de-escalation in the levels of tension in numerous conflicts in the Third World. The states of inertia, which had marked the India-Pakistan relationship for the last four decades till 1990s, saw a rapid increase of tensions and hostility with a massive uprising in Kashmir's freedom struggle in 1989. The unprecedented tension led to the nuclear crisis of 1990s, when both sides had reportedly prepared their weapon systems for a possible exchange. South Asia's core regional conflict is that which exists between India and Pakistan although it is perceived by the India-China threat perception, which is structurally different and does not relate to the same degree of interaction that characterize India-Pakistan rivalry. India, on the contrary, claims that the South Asian security parameters are greatly the dividends of India-China relations, which cannot be viewed in isolations from the Pakistan-China axis or the India-Pakistan matrix.³³ There is widespread belief in the strategic community of New Delhi that the Indian state is under threat from one or possibly other combinations of Islam, Western, Chinese and small regional powers. In this milieu however, the degree of threat perceived emerging from Pakistan is higher than that any other from regional state, though India continues to maintain that China is the country from which it faces the highest degree of threat. The argument is based on the set of assumptions that Pakistan is regional destabilize and is

involved in conspiracies to cut India to size. The mode prescribed or the pursuit of a policy of bleeding Indian polity internally through the instigation of anti-Indian feeling in the minorities dissatisfied with the Union. The post partitioned experiences, coupled with protracted continued confrontation on Kashmir, and the signals of India reluctance to accept and recognize the boundaries of Pakistan as an independent and sovereign state has led to the argument in Islamabad that India had not recognized to the reality of Pakistan. The root cause of conflict amid perceptions and imminent threats from both sides remained the historical legacy of the Kashmir dispute. During the landmark year of 1990, innumerable skirmishes across the control line, increased infighting between the two protagonists and the uprising in the Indian held Kashmir let to the Indian claim that increased clashes in the Kashmir struggle were the result of Pakistani acts of (alleged) subversion against India. At the cornerstone of these allegations was what India claimed as irrefutable evidence that the primary actors were not Kashmiri but are primary infiltrators sent across the border to spark a wave of secessionist movements. Pakistan however, understood the movement on Kashmir in its *rason-de-etat*, but was nevertheless concerned about the happening in the valley and was inclined to extend her support to the Kashmiri fighter on diplomatic and moral pretexts. The Indian argument thereby had no basis in the eyes of the policy makers of Islamabad, as Pakistan had never given up its claims on Kashmir. Consequently, the concern shown by Pakistan over the growing tension in the valley was a sign of affinity, which the people of Pakistan held for their Kashmiris brethren. However, in the historical background and due to the working dimensions of the forces, between the two warring States, Kashmir becomes the most explosive issue between India and Pakistan in the 1990s, leading to possible nuclear standoff."²² Following the 1990s crisis, India and Pakistan agreed to adopt measures to reduce the risk of war by stationing UN monitors along the line of control in Kashmir to provide both sides information on force deployment and movement.³⁴ Nevertheless no attempt was made to institutionalize the measures. Institutional communication mechanism between the Indian and Pakistani military leadership had been in existence since September 1971 albeit the 1990 crisis failed to see the effective use of confidence building measures during the height of the conflict. This indicates that the bi-partisan rivalry that had characterized the relationship among the two states during the cold war did not end with the demise of the Soviet Union.³⁵ The end of the Cold War and shift towards conflict resolutions and non-use of force was still not a workable or viable strategy in South Asia. The year 1991 saw considerable development in the confidence building measures between the two states. As in 1991, an agreement between Pakistan and India on advance notice on, military exercises, maneuvers and troop maneuvers was signed. The purpose was to prevent any crisis situation arising due to the misreading of the other side's intentions. The agreement called for the avoidance of holding of joint, air, naval and military exercises in close proximity to each other's international borders. This was followed by an agreement on prevention of air space violations also signed in year 1991. In addition, the agreement on non-attack on each other's nuclear facilities was 'also ratified in 1991.³⁶ In 1992, joint declaration on prohibition of chemical weapons was made. Despite the

declaration, it was revealed in 1997 that the Indian chemical weapon program was larger than declared. While the establishment of the hotline between the Indian and Pakistani air force came about in 1993, on the test of the establishment of communication between the naval vessels and aircraft of the two navies within each other's vicinity May 1993. These measures were aided by the good will measures of 1993 like the participation of senior military and civilian officials in various seminars in each other's country. Hence, not only moves were made in the military field but in the political field to ease tensions by people inside but also outside the sub-continent between the two neighbors.³⁷ The first round was held at Islamabad on July 17-18, 1990. In view of the rising tensions in Kashmir, the main issue during the talks remained the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan produced two non-papers for creating a propitious climate in Indian held Kashmir and the modalities for holding a plebiscite there. The Indian note including a total of six non papers, which pertained to other issues like the line of control, Siachin, Sir Creek and Wullar Barrage. None of the paper described or referred to the international situation in Kashmir.³⁸

The situation in the Indian held Kashmir led to serious deterioration of the climate of co-operation between the two states. In order to confront the heightened level of tension within the valley, India moved three divisions and large bodies of paramilitary forces into Kashmir in the spring of 1990 Pakistan, which alarmed Pakistan and it took counter measures as a possible defense against Indian aggression across the border. Increased political tension between the two had given rise to fears of military confrontation. A special US mission was carried out by Deputy National Security Adviser, Robert Gates, to emphasize the de-escalation of the crisis. It is thus a matter of debate whether de-escalation took place amid increasing pressure on India and Pakistan from the world capitals to refrain from opting for a full-scale war or the impact of the tri-angular development resulting from Sino-Indian normalization or the strength of China-Pakistan relations. China did of express concern over the development in Kashmir and offer to mediate more in its own capacity as a great regional power rather than as a quid-pro quo of the Sino-Indian normalization. One of the prime reasons for the developments during this period was violence in Indian occupied Kashmir. Nevertheless, the success gained in the diplomatic field did not translate into 'de-escalation of the conflict in the case of the Kashmir uprising. In this context, the most significant event that caused severe stains in Indo-Pak ties was the Hazrat Bal Shrine desecration on March 1, 1992 preceded by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front call to cross the line of control to the Indian side. During this year Pakistan and China signed two accords on the nuclear plants set up near Mianwali at Chashma. The accord signified that the extent of relations between China and Pakistan was to be decided in Beijing and Islamabad rather than Washington and New Delhi. High tension in the context of India-Pakistan relations marked the year. This period could be termed as a high water marked of the increased pace of Sino-Indian normalization, culminating in the first concrete signing of the CBM agreement Signed in 1993, between the two on the border issue. Similarly the early nineties saw the same state of relations between Pakistan China despite obvious international and US pressure on the redefining of the nature of relations between the two states. The Sino-Indian move towards normalization therefore picked pace

in this phase. The deteriorating internal situation in India and the increased fighting in Kashmir cast deep shadows on the efforts towards normalization in India and Pakistan relations. Another factor contributing to this was the case of both the countries and the internal security situation, which so for India warranted and the focus of threat to directed towards external sources. The year thus saw a more hard-line Indian approach on the Kashmir issue. While convergence of Pakistan's interest with the Chinese worldview has been but an image of close parallels. In the South Asian context India-Pakistan relations have been lying the basis of peace and Security to the region. Following the May 1998 tests India and Pakistan went through a brief period of normal symbolization by the Lahore declaration and the Bus Diplomacy. China stated that it favoured the normalization process in the countries and was all for the positive development Nevertheless in the wake of the 'Kargal Crisis' the normalization process between Pakistan and India came to an abrupt halt. However, during and after the Indian claimed that it was a result of a breach of trust, which necessitated a strong reaction against Pakistan. China maintained that the Kashmir issue was a dispute left over by History, which needed to be settled peaceful means in the light of the Shimla agreement and the UN resolution and in the spirit of the 'Lahore Declaration'.³⁹

India as Factor : In the face of the rapid changes in the international system, and underlying emphasis on factors like globalization and free market economy it was necessary to see, how far the international trends had transcended the-mutual relations of Pakistan, India and China, a bi-product of super power policy of engagement and inter-state relations and mix of regional power politics. Therefore in order to view the impacts of cross border links on the state of inter-state relations of the three major players in the region, the security perception of the three states as well as the process of the normalization of their ties was taken as a unit of analysis. Structurally the purpose of hypothesis was to see whether Sino-Indian normalization was in turn affected by Pak- China relations. Which had an impact on India-Pakistan relations? Hence, in order to arrive at conclusion and especially to determine the impact of these changes on the foreign policy orientation of the three States, the process and prospects of potential normalization in India-Pakistan relations were examined in the back drop of the intertwined process of the normalization in Sino-Indian ties and the Pakistan-China relations.

Conclusion : If we discuss about the relations between the countries, then the relations between the different countries change with time and circumstances. There are many motivations behind these changes. But internal and external factors play the most important role. Internal factors include changes in governments and external factors in the global strategic environment-A period of political, military, economic and ideological confrontation began between the two superpowers in order to dominate the world. The environment had a profound effect on the foreign relations of the rest of the world and In view of these two superpowers either joined or decided to remain neutral. The friendship between Pakistan and China, which was formed at a time when the Cold War was in full swing, was not affected by these exciting changes but deepened over time. Many governments came and went in Pakistan and China. But the friendly relations and co-

operation between the two countries did not falter, but each new government strengthened the foundation of that friendship. These are the reasons why Pak-China relations are called a unique example of friendship. It is generally said that the foundation of Pak-China friendship was laid in the mid-1960s, when the two countries. The border agreement was signed in 1963 and PIA was allowed to start flying at Islamabad Seabasing Airport. Both these agreements had far-reaching consequences not only regionally but also globally as Pakistan and China had agreed on this by marking their common border in the north a year ago due to a border dispute between India and China. The war had broken out. Relations between the two countries were strained after the war. The 1963 Border Agreement and the establishment of an air link with China via Pakistan made the US Containment Policy against China substantially ineffective. To this day, China has not forgotten this friendly move of Pakistan. At a time when the United States was announcing a diplomatic and trade boycott against China. Pakistan recognized the new Chinese government in 1950, just two years after the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is worth noting that China did not allow Pakistan's participation in the SATO to affect bilateral relations. Although the United States made the agreement to put military pressure on China, but on the occasion of the Afro-Asian Conference in Indonesia in 1955 when the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Bogra assuring Chinese Prime Minister Chuan Lai that Pakistan would not take part in any military action against China from the SATO platform, the Chinese leaders were satisfied. Since then, China has continued to condemn the SATO, but has never criticized Pakistan's involvement in it, but has continued to make political, diplomatic and trade progress in relations between the two countries is an example. One of the salient features of China's foreign policy since its inception has been that China has always favored the principle of bilateral relations when establishing relations with its neighbors and other countries that relations with any third country should influence not allowed. An important aspect of Pak-China bilateral relations is the growing power of India under the auspices of the US which is dissatisfied with the development of China and wants to tighten the noose around it. And in these circumstances, Pakistan is China's most trusted friend. The same is true of Pakistan, which was left alone by the United States in times of need, as well as economic and trade sanctions. Thus, the common enemy and the common interests in the region brought China and Pakistan closer together.

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